Eldem, Umut2025-03-262025-03-2620202386-765510.5281/zenodo.38651202-s2.0-85090532443https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.3865120https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.14704/845In this paper I provide a detailed account of Kant's conception of conscience in order to answer a significant question that has recently arisen in the secondary literature: How should we understand Kant's insistence on the infallibility of conscience? Some commentators have tried to make sense of the claim by suggesting that conscience is a special kind of moral judgment, while others have argued that it is a kind of feeling. My contention is that neither option is helpful in comprehending why and how Kant develops his ideas about conscience in this specific and peculiar way. I argue that the appropriate way to understand this conception is to establish its broader significance for Kant's moral philosophy, together with his understanding of human moral agency.eninfo:eu-repo/semantics/closedAccessImmanuel Kant; moral judgment; conscience; moral anthropology; practical philosophyArticle13111N/A110WOS:000538986000006N/A